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Introduction
A nuclear weapon (made of uranium or plutonium) det onated by a terrorist in a large U.S. city could kill a half-million people and cause one trillion dollars in direct Our interdiction model, which is formulated in ?2, con siders a spatial queueing system in a circle, whose perime ter represents the wall of radiation sensors. Customers correspond to vehicles triggering a sensor (typically a false ing the arc/ray strategy, in which the interdiction vehicle catches the customer by moving first along the arc from 6S to 6C and then along the ray generated by 9C, to the ray/arc strategy, in which the interdiction vehicle moves along the ray generated by 0S and then along the arc from 6S to 6C. Our analysis has three steps. The first step is to approx imate the optimal resting location and the average distance a customer travels before being caught given that the server is idle and at the optimal resting location. We then approx 
The M/M/l/2 Queue. Motivated by the observation that for any realistic value of a there is almost no chance of catching a customer who arrives to find more than one other customer in the system, we use (5) to approximate the queueing system by an M/M/l/2 queue with arrival rate A/M and service rate p, which will be calculated shortly. The exponential service time approximation might perform well because the queueing system has behavior similar to an infinite-server queue (because it is in light traffic) and a loss system (because it has only one buffer space), both of which have performance measures that are insensitive to the service-time distribution (Gross and Harris 1985).
In addition, we allow reneging of customers arriving to find one other customer in the system because they may be uncatchable. We assume that the time until reneging for customers that arrive to find one customer in the system is an exponential random variable with mean rx~\ so that the steady-state probability of arriving to this queue when it has zero, one, or two customers, respectively, is ( we let p~l=ms + mn (7) where mt is the mean chase time, which we compute using a fixed-point approach. Let Pn be the fraction of customers arriving to find one customer in the system who are even tually caught. In Equation (14), we compute the reneging probability Pr, which equals l ? Pn. Let te be the mean time it takes the server to catch a customer when the server is idling at his resting location when the customer arrives, and let tb be the mean time it takes to catch a customer (who does not renege) when the server is busy at the time of the customer arrival. Dividing the expected distance the cus tomer travels, given in Equation (5) by (6) and (7). (10) Solving ( Expected Damage. Finally, to compute the expected damage, we assume that with probability p2 customers are not catchable and cause damage b, with probability p0 customers are caught at average radius R ? {a + 2)Rtt/ 2(a+ l)(aM + 7r) by Equation (4) and successfully det onate with probability q, and with probability px a server does not begin the chase until after a residual (travel plus on-site) service time. For this last group of customers, a fraction rx/{rx + p) renege, and hence cause damage b, and the only remaining difficulty is to estimate the mean distance the nonreneging customers travel before being caught (at which point they detonate with probability q).
In terms of our earlier notation, the mean amount of time a nonreneging customer travels before the server begins chas ing him is E[T2 \ T2 < Tx], i.e., the mean residual service time conditioned on it being less than the time until the customer is uncatchable. Assuming T2 is exponential with the parameter in ( Arrival rate, X the probability that a terrorist reaches the target versus the arrival rate; if we denote this probability by pT, then the probability that a terrorist successfully detonates is pT + {\-pT)q.
The simulated values were derived by averaging over 10 simulations, each with 100,000 arrivals and truncating the statistics from the first 10,000. Equation ( 
